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1 1. Can “practice” and “practices” be used as epistemological tools to study history? Can
these concepts be used to break up unilateral and teleological narratives one the one
hand, and, on the other, to provide a basis for a new understanding and writing of
history  and histories?  The  twelve  essays  (by  thirteen authors)  collected  by  Francis
Chateauraynaud and Yves Cohen under the title Histoires Pragmatiques (in the EHESS’s 
Raisons  pratiques.  Epistémologie,  sociologie,  théorie  sociale  series)  are bound together by
such a research hypothesis, as well as by the scientific pluralism it entails.
2 This review is divided into two main parts. The first gives an account of the content of
the  book,  stressing  the  affinities  between  the  various  essays,  as  the  editors’
coordination  and  introduction  also  do.  In  the  second  part,  starting  from  the
divergences between the same essays, I will try to point out what I think are the main
ambiguities and the limits of the pragmatic approach (or approaches).  Reference to
further literature will be kept to a minimum.
3 2. The intention to discuss ambiguities and limits is, of course, shared by the editors,
who open the book with the harsh controversy – a genuine Pratiquesstreit – between
Angelo  Torre  and  Roger  Chartier,  which  appeared  in  the  Italian  journal  “Quaderni
Storici” in 1995-96.1
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4 By retracing the theoretical steps of António Manuel Hespanha (focusing on his history
of political institutions) and Chartier (comparing the latter’s to Bourdieu’s, in which he
identified its true matrix), Torre criticized the “practice paradigm” (“paradigma della
pratica”) which dominated the 1980s. He emphasized that its theoretical framework
“suffers from having been developed as a tool in an ideological debate, in the context of
the reaction against transactionalism and interactionism,” looking for a way to avoid
the symmetric dangers of positivism and individualism. According to Torre, a possible
definition of practices lies in the fact that “the validity of practices lies in their being
actions acknowledged as legitimate because of their special relation with legitimation
devices  in  a  certain  context  (situation)”;  thereby,  “reading  actions  in  terms  of
legitimation allows [us] to see how rules are created though action” (820-1). Chartier, for
his part, claims that his own work was a defense against the linguistic turn, rather than
a capitulation to it, inasmuch as it maintained – through a thorough reading of sources
and awareness  of  their  social  context  and epistemological  limits  –  “the  irreducible
difference between the practices shaping social relations, and those presiding over the
production of discourse.”
5 The editors found it useful to recover this twenty year-old dialogue, inasmuch as it
brings many unresolved issues explicitly (and harshly) to a head. At that point, on the
one hand, the depth of the crisis of the classical historiographical paradigms had been
fully  revealed;  on  the  other,  the  proposed  innovations  and  turns  coming  from
philosophy and linguistics had displayed many of their limits and fallen short of most
of their proclamations. The main targets of these innovations and turns were notions
such as structure and, most of all, of process: notions which, I will argue in the latter part
of this review, are still to be considered vital to the work of the historian. In recalling
that controversy, the aim of the editors may be to suggest that, twenty years on, the
time has come to accept the all-encompassing potential of a notion such as practice,
with its ability to surpass its anti-structuralist origin and to overcome objections such
as  that  of  Torre.  The  question is  whether,  behind the  diversity  of  practices  (in  the
plural), we can detect an idea of practice that is as flexible as it is shared, and whether it
provides  the  main  thread  for  this  volume.  In  my  opinion,  the  notions  of  practice/
practices appearing in the essays overlap only in part.
6 The  essays  share  the  aim  of  studying  documents  in  their  collective  dimension,
highlighting their production as a collective process involving different social actors
and, most importantly, as a framework for ideas of legitimacy. Documents, therefore,
are seen neither as a creation of a single individual (Ernest Mattern, in Yves Cohen’s
essay,  is  taken as  a  representative of  a  generation of  Taylorist  engineers)  nor  as  a
fragment  of  social  totality  (Fanny Gallot’s  filles  d’usines  are  not  a  mere  slice  of  the
industrial  working  class,  but  a  group  struggling  to  gain  a  new  representation  and
reputation).  Rather,  they  are  the  products  of  the  practice  of  groups  (social,
professional, communities, etc.), in their dialectical relationship with norms. Sociology
would speak of a meso level between the micro and the macro. 
7 Documents may convey the will of authoritarian organization and social control, as in
the case of Cohen’s social  engineers,  Mattern and Stalin.  More often, they bear the
stamps and scars of long processes of negotiation: inside institutions and between the
institutions and the State (as in Grégory Dufaud’s essay on Soviet psychiatric institutes
in the 1920s and 1930, which starts from the accidents and arrives at the public debate
that  influenced  the  Council  of  People’s  Commissars’  decisions  in  1936);  between
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different  social  actors  confronting  each  other  in  the  arena  of  politics  and  public
opinion (Chateauraynaud shows how asbestos and GMOs are made into health issues and
political  issues);  between  different  subjects  inside  a  community,  cooperating  but
holding different demands (Marie Bouhaïk-Gironès analyzes the manuscripts and the
accountants’ books, revealing the procedure of compromise and adjustments, in which
ideas of legitimacy and book-keeping concerns are meddled with); between the project
and its realization (Frédéric Graber outlines a “pragmatic history of formes projet,” an
anthropological and sociological reading of which, following Boltanski, may point out a
true apologetics of capitalism); between different contexts, building a bridge between
which  may  be  the  task  of  a  specific,  professionalized  group  (such  as  Stéphane
Péquignot’s case study, through documents coming from the Arxiu Històric de la Ciutat
de Barcelona, of the hard work of the Aragonese, French, and Castillan ambassadors to
bring  the  parties  involved  to  an  agreement  on  the  heir  to  the  throne  of  Aragon,
following the death of Martin I in 1410).
8 The  relationship  between  practice  and  theory  is  perhaps  the  most  sensitive  point.
Cohen even admits that it is easier to define practice by negation, that is, by opposition,
in the first instace, to the history of ideas; as soon as a positive definition is attempted,
however, it must integrate “the way in which actors, in each of the examined practices,
conceive what practice is. […] In fact, in these practices, in the very movement of their
development, debates on practice take place, between practitioners” (109). No practice
without theory of practice, therefore. We are dealing with a “pragmatism which does
not specifically deal with American pragmatist philosophy” (111): it looks like Taylorist
engineers and managers, like Monsieur Jourdain, were pragmatists without knowing it
(and  one  might  ask,  therefore,  to  what  extent  philosophical  pragmatism  was  the
ideological projection of the organizational drive and managerial revolution of early
20th Century America). In this essay (as in Tullio Viola and Roberto Gronda’s interview
in  the  present  issue)  Cohen  resumes  the  bulk  of  his  life-spanning  research:  the
legitimation  of  practices  of  social  control  through  efficiency  and  science  is  the
fundamental  characteristic  of  the  “siècle  des  chefs,”  the  “century  of  leaders”
dominated by Stalin and Ford, the Bolsheviks and the Matterns.
9 In the essay written by Béatrice Delaurenti  we see an example of the building of a
theory of action, through the debate on the possibilities of action at a distance in the
Middle Ages (13th-14th Centuries), involving medicine, philosophy, and theology, going
from Aristotle to Richard of Middleton (but, once again, documents are to be studied as
a collective production: we have access to some of the students’ notes). Such a debate
can  be  seen,  according  to  Delaurenti,  as  “a  step  in  men’s  reflection  on  their  own
possibilities  of  action,  and  also  an  event  provoking  a  rupture  in  intelligibility”;  a
rupture in which the “double function of medieval discourse, at the same time creative
and normalizing” (171-2), can flourish.
10 The final point of this reflection on the relationship between theory and practice is the
essay on re-enactment as a possible tool for pragmatic history, in which Rémy Campos
and Nicolas Donin classify different ways of putting sources into practice – with examples
ranging  from  Leroi-Gourhan’s  experimental  archaeology  to  the  reactivation  of  the
memory of the actors themselves, as director Pierre Huyghe did with bank robber John
Wojtowicz in the documentary The Third Memory (1999). Cohen too, as he explains in the
interview,  has been studying how the factory works as  a  worker:  “Back then I  was
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Maoist.  I  was  a  worker,  I  was  engaged  in  politics,  and  I  reflected  on  the  same
experiences as a historian.”
11 Roberto  Frega’s  is  the  most  theoretical  essay  in  this  collection,  and  also  the  most
theoretically  consistent,  addressing  the  plurality  of  all  the  possible  and  sometimes
contrasting  meanings  of  a  pragmatic  history.  The  latter  can  be  meant  in  both  a
methodological and an ontological sense (more precisely, a “functional ontology,” 337):
starting from this  distinction,  Frega reaches an elastic  notion of  practice as  “a key
concept insofar as it allows to show the articulation of this heterogeneous material; in
this sense, it is necessary to understand that science is neither knowledge, nor conflict,
nor technology, but rather the complex arrangement of all such factors” (336). This
notion comes from the realm of science but may be fruitfully applied to others, such as
social history: Frega’s favorite reference is to Charles Tilly’s contentious repertoires,
clearly situated on a meso level of collective action and legitimation. “Neither a history
of individual conducts, nor history of social totalities: pragmatic history shall find its
balance in this intermediary ontological dimension of practices” (344). 
12 What is perhaps the most interesting and fertile feature of pragmatist historiography
is, in fact, its ability to “liven up” sources by combining a thorough internal analysis
with an enquiry into the social and cultural conditions of their production (and also
their reading, as Chartier has shown us). We can take for example Bouhaïk-Gironès’s
essay,  dedicated  to  “writing  in  action”  (“l’écriture  en  action”)  –  namely,  the  writing
processes of a Mystère de saint Sebastien, Chalon-sur-Saône, Saône-et-Loire, 1497, and a
Mystère  des  trois  Doms,  Romans,  Drôme,  1509,  commissioned  by  the  communes.  The
“mise en texte” is the preparatory stage of a “mise en scène.” The manuscript of the
Mystère  de  saint  Sebastien,  for  instance,  “shows  different  interventions  in  the  text,
though a system of signs in the margins (sharps, crosses, capital letters, etc.); simple
corrections of verses, changes of characters in some performances (especially involving
the devil),  deletion or expansion of  some roles,  […] addition of  some episodes and,
finally,  instructions  in  Latin  on  scenography,  representation,  pauses,  and  musical
moments (the so-called silete)” (93); it goes without saying that, from this perspective,
“the historian will find what is most revealing in the document not in the information
that its author wanted but, rather, in what he deleted, in the signs bearing witness of
the  errors  or  hesitations  of  actors,  notaries,  and  parties”  (99).  In  this  essay,  in
conclusion, the case studies are intertwined with reflections on how to detect the vivid
traces of practice in historical sources.
13 3. The common goal of putting practices at the center of their enquiries, while building
their  framework  with  norms,  shall  not  let  the  divergences  between  the  essays  be
overlooked.
14 The most striking concerns perhaps the manifold spectrum of attitudes towards the
documents. On the one hand, we find once again the notion that some special method
could make historical sources “speak for themselves” (it is here repeated by Graber and
Dufaud); on the other hand, there is in Campos and Donin’s essay an “overflowing” of
the historian’s own work, which is supposed to produce, through re-enactment and the
other reproduction techniques, new sources and new archives (279).
15 Different practices go together, needless to say, with different theories. The different
backgrounds of the authors are reflected in the different genealogies that they propose
for  the  pragmatic  approach,  the  two  drawn  by  Torre  and  Frega  being  the  most
articulate.  While  the  former  is  explicitly  polemic,  the  latter  appreciates  the
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heterogeneity of the cultural streams converging in the pratiques approach, starting
with Wittgenstein and going beyond Bourdieu. While Dufaud emphasizes the centrality
of William James, Cohen, for his part,  through Bernard Lepetit,  traces it  all  back to
Kantian anthropology (which was written “from a Pragmatic Point of View”). In their
introduction,  Chateauraynaud  and  Cohen  go  as  far  as  Polybius.  While  such  a
heterogeneity may be a strong point insofar as it concurs in its elasticity, enabling it to
encompass many different shades in the relation between practices and norms, it is
arguable that it may also reveal deeper weaknesses and as yet unresolved issues.
16 The difficulty of combining philosophical perspectives as different as Wittgenstein’s,
Foucault’s, and the American pragmatists’, is perhaps underestimated, making such a
combination look more straightforward and harmonious than it could be: one needs
only to think of the different notions and functions of power in these philosophers.
Furthermore, in the effort of tracing its titles of nobility back to the classics in the
writing of  history (such as Marc Bloch and Carlo Ginzburg and microhistory in the
editors’ introduction, and Bouhaïk-Gironès’s essay, or the reference to moral economy,
in Graber’s), the deep bond these had with economic context and technical conditions
is often overlooked. 
17 If  we  are  to  take  seriously  the  purpose  of  considering  meaningful  what  has  been
omitted, we should underline the outright absence, in this syncretism, of Karl Marx,
and to ask if a specific reason for this absence can be identified. Marx in fact appears
only in Cohen’s essay, and even there, in the background (121 and 124). Still, one might
argue  that  a  pragmatist  approach  could  fruitfully  draw  on  historical  materialism’s
stress on human practice and on its ability to shape theory and culture (compare Theses
on Feuerbach, VIII: “All social life is essentially practical”). The answer is probably that
Marxian stress on social totality (human essence as “the ensemble of social relations,”
Theses on Feuerbach,  VI) is not compatible with pragmatism, which tends to see it as
mere determinism and to focus on the level of intentionality. I will try to come back to
these problems in the latter part of the review.
18 What  is  certain  is  that, if  one  wishes  to  understand  the  position  of  the  pratiques 
approach  to  history  in  the  history  of  methodologies  and,  broadly  speaking,  in  the
history of culture (an understanding which probably goes together with weighing its
potentialities and obscurities), it is necessary to go beyond the pragmatist historian’s
own self representation and internal debate.
19 In his introduction to an Italian collection of Chartier’s essays, Carlo Ginzburg set a
positivist approach to sources, according to which any document could be used as a
“clear and direct testimony of social reality,” against “a radically different, and more
sophisticated, path, according to which each source can bear witness only to itself and,
therefore, the only reality the historian can have access to is that of representation. It
is  a  radically  idealistic  view,  which,  taken to  the  extreme,  would prevent  different
archival series from being integrated and would block, therefore, the very possibility of
historical research.”2 Chartier’s was a “third way” between the two, inasmuch as he
aimed at discovering the bond between reality and representation precisely through
the inversions and silences in the representations themselves – in the case, at least, of
marginalities, namely the cours des miracles’ beggars in the 16th and 17th centuries.
20 By bringing it all back to a contrast between a positivistic and an idealistic approach to
sources, Ginzburg highlights that the fundamental traditions in the history of culture
are always in action. Therefore, its fundamental issues are always at stake, no matter
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how radical innovations and ruptures are supposed to be. The combination of history
and pragmatism is  no exception:  in the first  place,  because of  its  explicit  syncretic
nature;  and  in  the  second place,  because  of  the  absolute  priority  it  confers  to  the
subjectivity  of  actors,  whose  action  and  agency  are  structurally  founded  on  their
worldviews (which also means that conflicting actions are in the end founded on a
conflict between norms and worldviews, as is the case with the conflict between the
Taylorist Mattern and the workers).
21 What the pratiques approach seems to lack is precisely the desire to understand what is
going on beyond the conscience of the historical actors, while shaping it. In this regard,
once again, the classics in historiography have not finished saying what they have to
say. Since pratiques had been conceived in opposition to structures, namely, as a device
to  unlock  the  often  suffocating  determinism  of  the  latter  (this,  as  I  have  already
recalled,  seems  to  be  the  main  thread  of  the  present  book),  they  often  ended  up
forgoing a broad range of questions about the logic of historical changes – questions
that fall under the concept of process.
22 What could appear at  first  sight  as  mere reverting to the old controversy between
structures and processes might, on the contrary, be a step forward, if one thinks of the
definition given by Ellen Meiksins Wood of Edward P. Thompson’s research: structured
processes,  “in  which  relations  of  production  exert  their  pressures  by  transforming
inherited realities.”3 Thompson focused on the Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions
in England as deep social traumas. It is no small achievement, and accounts in part for
the fact that his essays on English social history in the 18th and 19th centuries are now
essential references about the making of the working classes in many different contexts
around the world (this applies in particular to his book on the Making of the English
Working Class, notwithstanding the fact that Thompson here deals with a subject located
at the very heart of Europe, i.e., the industrial revolution and its role in the genesis of
European political cultures).
23 Recalling E. P. Thompson allows us point to out what the pratiques approach seems to be
losing  in  its  evolution  from  tool  to  paradigm:  the  ability  to  grasp  the  connection
between  human  collective  action  and  cultures  and  the  processes  which  inform
consciousness  even when they evade it.  By  focusing on the  supposed meso  level  of
practices, the connection between the micro and the macro falls out of the spotlight; it is
the latter, obviously, which is most feared and explicitly rejected (for both practical
and theoretical reasons, see Frega’s essay).
24 While “thinking through consequences” [“penser par consequences”] hardly looks like
an  original  and  revealing  perspective,  historians  cannot  allow  unthought  of
consequences  to  fall  out  of  sight  –  consequences  which  are  not  apparent  to  the
conscience of the actors themselves. There is a broad range of phenomena which it is
not possible to understand (or even to grasp) merely by considering them as the result,
or net force, of the different ends, means and practices of different social actors and
groups. To take but one, general example: in the rise and evolution of capitalism, both
at the core and the peripheries of its expansion, new market and labor relations were
subsumed  under  the  capitalist  mode  of  production  by  the  combination  of  direct
coercive force and the impersonal agencies of accumulation, of the labor process itself
and its technical exigencies, of the developments of commerce and finance, and so on.
The expansion, generalization and differentiation of capitalism was a process imposing
itself “in the shape of external coercive laws” (Marx), which often engaged in a violent
Francis Chateauraynaud & Yves Cohen (eds.), Histoires pragmatiques
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VIII-2 | 2016
6
struggle  with  pre-existing  norms  and  practices.  What  E. P. Thompson  called  “the
experience  of  determination”  unifies  the  micro,  meso  and  macro  levels  (and  in  this
experience we can see the materiality of structures of which Cohen speaks in Viola and
Gronda’s interview). This seeming externality is a level of objectivity which must itself
be understood in its historical scope. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIZZOCCHI Roberto, (1996), “Storia debole, storia forte,” Storica 5, 93-114.
CHARTIER Roger, (1996), “Rappresentazione della pratica, pratica della rappresentazione,” Quaderni
Storici, 92, xxxi, 2, August, 487-93.
GINZBURG Carlo, (1984), Foreword to Roger Chartier, Figure della furfanteria. Marginalità e cultura
popolare in Francia tra Cinque e Seicento, Roma, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 3-11.
MEIKSINS WOOD Ellen, (2016), Democracy Against Capitalism. Renewing Historical Materialism, London,
Verso.
TORRE Angelo, (1995), “Percorsi della pratica, 1966-1995,” Quaderni Storici, 90, xxx, 3, December,
799-829.
NOTES
1. Torre 1995 and Roger Chartier 1996. It is worth noting that the following issue of “Quaderni
Storici” (93 / a. XXXI,  n. 3, December 1996) was dedicated to Erudizione e fonti.  Storiografie della
rivendicazione and Torre was the editor, together with Enrico Artifoni. In their introduction they
wrote, clearly referring to the “pratiques approach” and to Chartier in particular (and clearly
subsuming  pragmatism  under  the  label  of  skepticism,  because  of  its  opening  the  doors  to
subjectivism): “New forms of skepticism shifted the historian’s attention from the source itself to
reading devices and to the argumentation and demonstration. There is a risk that the nature of
evidence,  its  uncertainty  and  stickiness are  used  to  legitimize  an  endless  proliferation  of
interpretations,  each  inasmuch  as  the  subjective  perception  becomes  the  foundation  of  the
attribution of meaning” (511). Cf. Bizzocchi 1996.
2. Ginzburg (1984: 8).
3. Meiksins Wood (2016: 71, and 79).
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